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MIGHT-COUNTERFACTUALS, TRANSWORLD 
UNTRUSTWORTHINESS AND 
PLANTINGA'S FREE WILL DEFENCE 
Michael Bergmann 
Plantinga's Free Will Defense (FWD) employs the following proposition as a 
premise: 
OTD. Possibly, every essence is transworld depraved. 
I argue that he fails to establish his intended conclusion because the denial of 
OTD is epistemically possible. I then consider an improved version of the FWD 
which relies on 
OTV. Possibly, every essence is transworld untrustworthy. 
(The notion of transworld untrustworthiness is the might-counterfactual coun-
terpart to Plantinga's would-counterfactual notion of transworld depravity.) I 
argue that the denial of OTU is also epistemically possible and, therefore, that 
the improved FWD fares no better than the original at establishing the compat-
ibility of God and evil. 
In his celebrated Free Will Defense (FWD), Alvin Plantinga aims to 
establish the compatibility of evil and God's existence. His FWD 
employs the following proposition as a premise: 
OTD. Possibly, every essence is transworld depraved. l 
I will argue that he fails to establish his intended conclusion because it is rea-
sonable to refrain from believing OTD. In other words, I will try to show that 
it is epistemically possible thaf 
[J-TD. Necessarily, some essence or other is not transworld 
depraved. 
Notice that one could show that 0-TD is epistemically possible either 
by arguing that it is epistemically possible that 
EPI. Some essence is necessarily not transworld depraved 
or by arguing that it is epistemically possible that 
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EP2. No essence is necessarily not transworld depraved but, neces-
sarily, some essence or other is not transworld depraved. 
I take the EPI route.3 
My paper has four sections. In the first, I defend the epistemic possi-
bility of EPl. In section 2 I explain how Plantinga could sidestep this 
objection by offering a strengthened version of his FWD - a version that 
relies on a premise weaker than OTD. (The weaker premise replaces 
Plantinga's would-counterfactual notion of transworld depravity with 
its might-counterfactual counterpart - the notion of transworld untrust-
worthiness.) Then, in section 3, I respond to this strengthened version of 
the FWD by defending a strengthened version of EPl. In the final sec-
tion I summarize the results of the paper in the context of a clarificatory 
framework that I hope will go some way toward preventing future mis-
understanding of Plantinga's oft misunderstood FWD. (Two examples 
of such misunderstanding, which I discuss briefly in the last section, can 
be found in John Hick's Evil and the God of Love (revised edition)4 and in 
J.L. Mackie's The Miracle of TheismS.) 
Before continuing, I should acknowledge that the truth of the claim 
that EPI is epistemically possible would not entail that Plantinga's FWD 
is of no use in responding to the problem of evil. What it would demon-
strate is that Plantinga has not shown that the existence of God is com-
patible with the existence of evil. At most, Plantinga has shown that it is 
epistemically possible that God and evil are compatible (assuming that 
OTD, like 0-TD, is epistemically possible). However, even if Plantinga's 
FWD has shown only that it is epistemically possible that God and evil 
are compatible, it still manages, thereby, to provide a somewhat satisfac-
tory response to the atheistic charge that the existence of God and the 
existence of evil are logically incompatible. Such a response is some-
what satisfactory because it shows that the atheistic charge depends on 
an assumption we can reasonably refrain from accepting. Nevertheless, 
it is clearly not as satisfactory a response as Plantinga had hoped for. 
1. In Defense of the Epistemic Possibility of EP1 
I will begin by defining the concept of transworld depravity using the 
notions of an E-perfect world and strong actualization. An E-perfect 
world is a world in which a creaturely essence E's instantiation is signifi-
cantly free (Le., has incompatibilist freedom with respect to doing or 
refraining from doing what is wrong) and always does what is morally 
right. And God strongly actualizes a state of affairs S iff God alone causes 
S to be actual (thus, S cannot include any creaturely exercise of incom-
patibilist freedom).6 With these concepts clear in our minds we can 
define transworld depravity as follows: 
A creaturely essence E is transworld depraved (in W) iff for every E-
perfect world W* the following counterfactual of freedom is true 
(in W): If God had strongly actualized T of W* (the largest state of 
affairs God strongly actualizes in W*) then E's instantiation would 
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have freely performed at least one morally wrong ace 
Now consider again EP1, the proposition I say is epistemically possible. 
Can we just see that every essence is such that it is possibly transworld 
depraved (i.e., can we just see that EP1 is false)? Plantinga says yes (and 
Rowe, r think, is inclined to agree). I find that surprising. First of all, the 
concept of transworld depravity is difficult to grasp. But even once it is 
grasped, I think we need some sort of reason for thinking every creaturely 
essence is possibly transworld depraved. I grant that some necessary 
truths are such that we can just see that they are true. But this doesn't 
seem to be one of them. Thus, in the absence of any argument against 
EP1, it seems only reasonable to say that it is epistemically possible. 
Well, perhaps there is some reason for thinking that every creaturely 
essence is possibly transworld depraved. As a matter of fact, I am aware 
of a line of reasoning that seems to suggest that very conclusion.s Here, 
in two stages, is an argument for the conclusion that every creaturely 
essence is possibly transworld depraved (i.e., that EP1 is false): 
Consider a world W in which a creaturely essence E1 is significantly 
free and always does what is right - an E1-perfect world. There will 
be a morally significant action A such that El's instantiation freely 
goes right with respect to A in W. And since El's instantiation has 
incompatibilist freedom, there will be some other world W* in which 
God strongly actualizes T of W (the largest state of affairs God strong-
ly actualizes in W) and El's instantiation goes wrong with respect to A. 
But if in W* God docs strongly actualize T of Wand E1's instantiation 
does go wrong with respect to A, then, in W*, the following counterfac-
tual of freedom is true: If God had strongly actualized T of W, El's 
instantiation would have freely gone wrong with respect to A. Since 
the above reasoning applies to any arbitrarily selected essence E and 
any arbitrarily selected E-perfect world W, we may conclude that 
Cl. For any creaturely essence E and any E-perfect world W 
the following counterfactual of freedom is possibly true: If 
God had strongly actualized T of W (the largest state of 
affairs God strongly actualizes in W), E's instantiation would 
have freely performed at least one morally wrong act. 
Stage two of the argument runs as follows. Consider some 
essence E and let W 1-n be all the E-perfect worlds." When we 
apply the reasoning of stage one to WI' we reach the conclusion 
that the following counterfactual of freedom is possibly true: If God 
had strongly actualized T of WI, E's instantiation would have 
freely performed at least one morally wrong act. Using similar rea-
soning for all the E-perfect worlds, we may conclude that each of 
the following counterfactuals of freedom is possibly true: 
CFl. If God had strongly actualized T of WI, E's instantiation 
would have freely performed at least one morally wrong act. 
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CF2. If God had strongly actualized T of W2, E's instantiation 
would have freely performed at least one morally wrong act. 
CFn. If God had strongly actualized T of Wn, E's instantiation 
would have freely performed at least one morally wrong act. 
Now there are some counterfactuals of freedom, each of which 
is possibly true, that could not be true in the same world. For 
example, we may suppose that each of the following counterfactu-
als of freedom is possibly true: 
If situation S were actual, E's instantiation would freely do A. 
If situation S were actual, E's instantiation would freely do 
not-A. 
Nevertheless, they cannot both be true in the same world. Now 
what about CFl through CFn? We have concluded that each is 
possibly true. But can all of them be true in the same world? It 
seems so. For no two of them will be of the form just noted. That 
is, no two will specify the same situation in the antecedent and also 
specify contradictory actions in the consequent. 
Thus, we may conclude that it is possible that all of CFl through 
CFn are true, i.e., there is a single world in which all of them are 
true. But then there is some world W* in which for every E-perfect 
world W the following counter factual of freedom is true: If God 
had strongly actualized T of W (the largest state of affairs God 
strongly actualizes in W), E's instantiation would have freely per-
formed at least one morally wrong act. In other words, it is possi-
ble that E is transworld depraved. And since Cl applies to any 
arbitrarily selected creaturely essence, we may conclude that 
C2. Every essence is possibly transworld depraved. 111 
C2 entails that EP} is false so this argument gives us a reason for 
thinking that EPI is not epistemically possible. ll 
In light of the above argument (which I will henceforth call "the argu-
ment against EPl"), one might think that we can see that every essence is 
possibly transworld depraved. Thus, if I want to maintain that EPI is 
epistemically possible, I will have to show what is wrong with that argu-
ment. 
We need look no further than stage one. Notice that that stage relied 
on the following premise: 
Pl. If in W* God does strongly actualize T of Wand El's instantia-
tion does freely perform at least one morally wrong act, then, in W*, 
the following counterfactual of freedom is true: If God had strong-
ly actualized T of W, El's instantiation would have freely per-
formed at least one morally wrong act. 
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But Plantinga explicitly rejects such a premise (at least as a general prin-
ciple).12 He insists that A & B does not imply If A were the case, then B 
would be the case. For it may be that although A and B are true, B is not 
true in certain of the nearby A-worlds. And the counterfactual in ques-
tion is true in an A-world W only if B is true in Wand in all the other A-
worlds closest to W. (The assumption here is that W might be tied for 
closeness with itself with other nearby A-worlds. 13) Thus, the above 
argument against EPI will not salvage Plantinga's FWD, at least not 
from Plantinga's perspective. 
2. Revising Plantinga's FWD 
At this point, there are a variety of responses available to Plantinga. 
However, when someone objects to a premise in your argument, it is 
always nice to point out that you can revise your argument so that it 
doesn't require that premise. Just such a response is available to 
Plantinga at this juncture. He doesn't need to rely on PI in order to 
argue that God and evil are compatible. Instead he can rely on 
PI *. If in W* God does strongly actualize T of Wand EI's instantia-
tion does freely perform at least one morally wrong act, then, in W*, 
the following counterfactual of freedom is true: If God had strong-
ly actualized T of W, EI's instantiation might have freely performed 
at least one morally wrong act. 
Notice that PI * is not open to objection in the way PI is. For the might-
counterfactual If A were the case B might be the case obviously does follow 
from the conjunction of A and B. (I'm reading the might-counterfactual 
If A were the case B might be tlze case as being true just in case B is true in at 
least one of the closest A-worlds.14) Thus, by modifying the argument so 
that it relies on PI * instead of PI, Plantinga would be able to sidestep the 
objection I proposed at the end of section l. 
Of course if we make this change to the section I argument against 
EPI, we are forced to make a few others as well. The conclusion of stage 
one will have to be changed from CI to 
CI *. For any creaturely essence E and any E-perfect world W the 
following counterfactual of freedom is possibly true: If God had 
strongly actualized T of W (the largest state of affairs God strongly 
actualizes in W), EI's instantiation might have freely performed at 
least one morally wrong act. 
And the conclusion of stage two will have to be changed from C2 to 
C2*. Every essence is possibly transworld untrustworthy 
where transworld untrustworthiness is defined as follows: 
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A creaturely essence E is transworld untrustworthy (in W) iff for 
every E-perfect world W* the following counterfactual of freedom 
is true (in W): If God had strongly actualized T of W* (the largest 
state of affairs God strongly actualizes in W*) then E's instantiation 
might have freely performed at least one morally wrong act. 
(This definition differs from the definition of transworld depravity only 
in the parts that are italicized.) 
But now we have a problem. Revising the argument against EPI so 
that it relies on the more plausible PI * instead of the questionable PI 
makes it cease to be an argument against EP1. For though C2 is incom-
patible with EPl, C2* is not. Instead, C2* is incompatible with 
EPI *. Some essence is necessarily not transworld untrustworthy. 
So now we have two different arguments. Let's call this modification of 
the argument against EPI (which replaces PI, Cl and C2 with PI *, CI * 
and C2*) lithe argument against EPI *". I said earlier that Plantinga could 
argue for his intended conclusion without relying on PI. It's true that 
the argument against EPI * avoids relying on PI. But how does it help 
him defend his intended conclusion? The argument against EPI helped 
insofar as it would have shown that EPI is not epistemically possible 
(thereby deflecting my objection to OTD). But what exactly is the rele-
vance of the argument against EPI *? 
The answer is that the argument against EPI * is helpful to the propo-
nent of the FWD only if she revises the FWD in the way I will now 
explain. Plantinga's FWD takes for granted a principle something like 
the following: 
P. For any essence E, any E-perfect world Wand any action A that 
is morally significant for E's instantiation in W, one of the follow-
ing counterfactuals of freedom is true: 
or 
(i) If God had strongly actualized T of W, E's instantiation 
would have freely gone wrong with respect to A. 
(ii) If God had strongly actualized T of W, E's instantiation 
would have freely gone right with respect to A. 
Now Plantinga says that this is an assumption that can be dispensed with 
in giving the FWD.I' He doesn't do so when he employs OTD as a premise. 
But, as we will see, he is right that he could dispense with that assumption. 
How exactly would the FWD go if it did not take the above principle 
for granted? Well, instead of starting with OTD as a premise, the propo-
nent of the strengthened version of the FWD would start with 
OTU. Possibly, every essence is transworld untrustworthy. 
Notice that if an essence E is trans world untrustworthy, God cannot 
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weakly actualize an E-perfect world. That is, there is nothing God could 
have done - no series of actions God could have taken - such that if he 
had, an E-perfect world would have been actual (notice the emphasis). 
Consequently, if every essence is transworld untrustworthy, then there is 
no way God could create free creatures and ensure that no evil occurs. 
But, you might reply, God could have sliperweakly actualized an E-
perfect world where 
God superweakly actualizes W iff (i) God strongly actualizes T of W, 
(ii) W is actual but (iii) it's not the case that if God had strongly actual-
ized T of W, W would have been actual. 
That is true, but it doesn't help the atheologian who wants to show that 
God's existence is incompatible with the existence of evil. For God can-
not be blamed for failing to superweakly actualize an E-perfect world if E 
is transworld untrustworthy. It's true that if E is transworld untrustwor-
thy God can strongly actualize a state of affairs such that if he does so, E's 
instantiation might always freely do what is right. But there is nothing 
God could do that would secure the actualization of an E-perfect world. 
Thus, if every essence is transworld untrustworthy, then no matter which 
essences God instantiates, he cannot guarantee that no free creature will 
do what is wrong. It follows from OTU (and the rest of the original 
FWD), therefore, that God's existence is compatible with the existence of 
evil. This is an improved version of Plantinga's FWD insofar as it does 
the same work as the original and yet relies on a weaker premise. 
So Plantinga doesn't have to rely on OTD as a premise in his FWD. 
He can instead rely on OTU.16 To oppose this premise I will have to 
maintain that it is epistemically possible that 
'J-TU. Necessarily, some essence or other is not transworld untrust-
worthy. 
And, as is the case with 1::-TO, there are two ways that one could show 
that 0-TU is epistemically possible. One could show that it is epistemi-
cally possible that 
EPI *. Some essence is necessarily not transworld untrustworthy. I? 
Or one could argue that it is epistemically possible that 
EP2*. No essence is necessarily not transworld untrustworthy but, 
necessarily, some essence or other is not transworld untrustworthy. 
Now we can see the relevance of the argument against EPI *. If it is success-
ful, it prevents someone like myself from relying on the epistemic possibility 
of EPI * in an attempt to object to the revised FWD. And since the argument 
against EPl* manages to avoid relying on the questionable premise PI, the 
revised FW 0 emerges unscathed from the objections considered thus far. 
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3. In Defense of the Epistemic Possibility of EPI * 
In section 2 I explained how the section 1 objection to stage anI' of the 
argument against EPI does not work against stage one of the argument 
against EPI *. But is stage two of the argument against EPI * successful? I 
will argue that the denial of one of the premises of stage two is epistemi-
cally possible. If ['m right about this, the argument against EPI * will be 
of no use in challenging the claim that EP1 * is epistemically possible. 
For EPI *, like EPI, is a modal proposition whose falsity we cannot just 
see. Unless we have some reason (that doesn't depend on a premise 
whose falsity is epistemically possible) for thinking EPI * is false, it is 
reasonable to take EPI * to be epistemically possible. 
50 what's wrong with stage two of the argument against EPI *? Recall 
that stage two of the argument against EPI employed the following 
premise: 
P2. For any essence E, if each of CFI through CFn is possibly true 
then it is possible that each of CFI through CFn is true. 
In the argument against EPI *, instead of CFI through CFn (which are 
would-counterfactuals of freedom) we have 
CFI *. If God had strongly actualized T of WI' E's instantiation 
might have freely performed at least one morally wrong act. 
CF2*. If God had strongly actualized T of W2' E's instantiation 
might have freely performed at least one morally wrong act. 
CFn*. If God had strongly actualized T of Wn, E's instantiation 
might have freely performed at least one morally wrong act. 
(Recall that WI-n are all the E-perfect worlds.1") Thus, in the argument 
against EPI * we must replace P2 with 
P2*. For any essence E, if each of CFI * through CFn* is possibly 
true then it is possible that each of CFI * through CFn* is true. 
I will be questioning P2*. But before I do, I would like to point out, in 
support of it, that although it is easy to see how two would-counterfactu-
als could be incompatible, it is not so easy to see how two might-counter-
factuals could be incompatible. As I said earlier, the following two 
would-counterfactuals are obviously incompatible: 
If situation 5 were actual, E's instantiation would freely do A. 
If situation 5 were actual, E's instantiation would freely do not-A. 
But the same cannot be said for the corresponding might-counterfactuals: 
If situation 5 were actual, E's instantiation might freely do A. 
If situation 5 were actual, E/s instantiation might freely do not-A. 
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Only a would-counterfactual is obviously incompatible with a might-
counterfactual (e.g., the first of the two might-counterfactuals is obvi-
ously incompatible with the second of the two would-counterfactuals). 
This helps us to see what's involved in denying P2*. Consider the fol-
lowing list of counterfactuals of freedom (where the notation used is the 
same as in the two earlier lists): 
CFI**. If God had strongly actualized T of WI, E's instantiation 
would have always freely done what is right. 
CF2**. If God had strongly actualized T of W2' E's instantiation 
would have always freely done what is right. 
CFn**. If God has strongly actualized T of Wn, E's instantiation 
would have always freely done what is right. 
Using this list, we can state the denial of P2* as follows: 
EP3. For some essence E, each of CFI * through CFn* is possibly 
true but it is necessarily the case that at least one of CFI ** through 
CFn** is true. 
In order to challenge P2*, I will have to say that EP3 is epistemically possible. 
The previous two paragraphs may make it seem difficult to question 
stage two of the argument for EPI *. For resisting that argument (in the 
way I suggest) commits us to conceding the epistemic possibility of its 
being necessary that at least one of a list of counterfactuals of freedom 
whose consequents assert that an essence E's instantiation would have 
always gone right is true (note that this is not to say that there is one coun-
terfactual on such a list that is necessarily true). But what could possibly 
explain the truth of EP3? 
As I said, the above paragraphs may make it seem difficult to question 
stage two of the argument for EPI *. But I don't see why they should 
make questioning it difficult. It's true that I don't know what could 
explain the truth of EP3. But of course I don't need to explain the truth of 
EP3 in order to defend the modest claim that it is epistemically possible. 
I grant that I can't see that EP3 is true. But a failure to see that EP3 is true 
is not the same thing as seeing that it is false.19 EP3 is like EPI and EPI * 
in that it is a modal proposition whose truth or falsity is not something 
we can just see in the absence of reasons. So until we have reasons for 
rejecting EP3, we should concede that it is epistemically possible. And 
because EP3 is epistemically possible, we are left with the conclusion 
that, in the absence of any other arguments for the falsity of EPI *, EPI * 
is epistemically possible too. This is enough to show that it is epistemi-
cally possible that OTU is false (and epistemically possible that OTD is 
false since OTD obviously entails OTU). Thus, neither Plantinga's FWD 
nor the improved version of the FWD that I've proposed here is success-
ful in showing that God and evil are compatible. At best they show that 
it is epistemically possible that God and evil are compatible. 
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The main sort of resistance I've encountered to this conclusion has to 
do with the fact that the truth of EP3 would be extremelv odd. It is 
extremely odd to think that the counterfactuals of freedom" in question 
are logically dependent on one another in the way EP3 suggests. I grant 
that that seems odd. But my point is that the oddness is at best a reason 
to refrain from endorsing EP3. The oddness of EP3 plays a role in our 
failing to see that it is true. But it does not enable us to see that EP3 is 
false. Consequently, EP3 is epistemically possible. 
4. Clarificatory Summary 
In this final section, I provide a framework within which to understand 
Plantinga's FWD as well as the objections and refinements discussed 
above. The FWD has often been misunderstood. I hope that what I say 
here can help prevent further misunderstanding in the future. After lay-
ing out this framework, I will use it to explain the concepts of 
transworld depravity and transworld untrustworthiness. I will also use 
it to summarize the arguments against EP1 and EP1 * (and for OTD and 
OTU) as well as some objections to both the original and improved ver-
sions of Plantinga's FWD. 
Let's suppose we can number all those creaturely essences which in 
some world or other are such that their instantiations have significant 
freedom and never do wrong. Let's call them E1-En.2I1 Now consider EI. 
Presumably there will be many worlds in which E1's instantiation has 
significant freedom and never does wrong. These are E1-perfect worlds. 
Let's number them E1PW1-E1PWn. Let T of a world be the largest state 
of affairs God strongly actualizes in that world. Now consider the fol-
lowing lists of counterfactuals of freedom ('WCF' for would-counterfac-
tuals and 'MCF' for might-counterfactuals): 
List WCFl 
If God had strongly actualized T of E1PW I, E1's instantiation 
would have freely performed at least one morally wrong act. 
If God had strongly actualized T of E1PW2' E1's instantiation 
would have freely performed at least one morally wrong act. 
If God had strongly actualized T of E1PWn, E1's instantiation 
would have freely performed at least one morally wrong act. 
List MCFl 
If God had strongly actualized T of ElPW1, E1's instantiation might 
have freely performed at least one morally wrong act. 
If God had strongly actualized T of E1PW2, E1's instantiation might 
have freely performed at least one morally wrong act. 
If God had strongly actualized T of EIPWn, El's instantiation 
might have freely performed at least one morally wrong act. 
Notice that there will be corresponding lists WCF2 and MCF2 and so on 
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right on up to WCFn and MCFn (one pair of lists for each of the essences 
EI-En mentioned above). Lists WCF2 and MCF2 will refer to the E2-per-
fect worlds E2PWI-E2PWn and lists WCF3 and MCF3 will refer to E3PWl-
E3PWn. More generally, lists WCFi and MCFi will refer to EiPWrEiPWn 
(defined in a way parallel to the above definitions of EIPWrEIPWn ). 
The above lists enable us to obtain a better grasp of some of the com-
plicated properties and propositions considered in this paper. A signifi-
cantly free creaturely essence Ei is transworld depraved if and only if 
each member of list WCFi is in fact true. And OTD (the questionable 
premise of Plantinga's original FWD) is true if and only if there is some 
world in which every member of every WCF-list is true. Likewise, a sig-
nificantly free creaturely essence Ei is transworld untrustworthy if and 
only if each member of list MCFi is in fact true. And OTU (the question-
able premise of the improved version of Plantinga's FWD) is true if and 
only if there is some world in which every member of every MCF-list is 
true. It's true that in order to fully understand the properties and propo-
sitions just explained one must put forth some effort to understand the 
notation as it is used in the WCF- and MCF-lists. But what is immedi-
ately obvious from these explanations is that the properties and proposi-
tions in question have to do with lists of counterfactuals of freedom. 
This is a significant gain in elucidation. For it's been my experience that 
philosophers who discuss these properties and propositions fail to rec-
ognize this. 
Let me illustrate this failure with a couple of examples of misunder-
standing (the first is Hick, the second is Mackie): 
For it may be that the beings (or some of them) who freely go 
wrong in the existing world would also go wrong in any other pos-
sible world. They would then exhibit what Plantinga calls 
'transworld depravity'." 
Curley Smith suffers from what Plantinga calls 'transworld 
depravity': in whatever world he exists, if he is significantly free he 
commits some wrong actions: this Plantinga takes to be a fact 
about Curley's individual essence. 22 
Each takes transworld depravity to be an essential property of essences: 
the property of being such that if it is instantiated with freedom, the 
resulting creature will freely perform at least one morally wrong act. 
But transworld depravity is a contingent property of essences: it's a prop-
erty an essence has if a certain list of would-counterfactuals of freedom 
pertaining to that essence's instantiation is in fact true.23 
Furthermore, the antecedent of each counterfactual of freedom on the 
list makes reference to a possible world in which the essence in question 
is perfect (recall that the counterfactuals say that if God had actualized T 
of some E-perfect world, then E's instantiation would have done some-
thing wrong). But then it is obvious that an essence suffering from 
transworld depravity is perfect in some world (and, therefore, obvious 
that Hick's and Mackie's understanding of transworld depravity is mis-
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taken). And the fact that the instantiation of an essence that in fact suf-
fers from transworld depravity is perfect in some world also makes it evi-
dent that transworld depravity is a contingent property. For if an essence 
E's instantiation is perfect in some world W, then in W the following is 
obviously true: there is some E-perfect world (i.e., W itself) such that if 
God had strongly actualized T of it, it is not the case that E's instantiation 
would have performed at least one morally wrong act. But that is to say 
that in W, E is not transworld depraved (since it shows that at least one 
member of the list of counterfactuals in question is false). 
1 suspect that one of the main reasons for the misunderstandings 
mentioned above is the name of the property: transworld depravity. The 
name suggests that it is a property exemplified in all worlds by (and 
therefore essential to) the essences that have it. But transworld depravi-
ty does not entail that the essence that has it is depraved (i.e., performs 
some morally wrong act) in every world. Rather it entails that the 
essence that has it is contingently such that it would have been depraved 
no matter which world God had tried to actualize (by strongly actualizing 
T of that world). 
Let's return to laying out the darificatory framework. Keeping in 
mind the meaning of the notation used in the WCF- and MCF-lists, con-
sider the following list of conjunctions ('F' for freely going wrong): 
List F1 
T of E1PW 1 is actual and E1's instantiation freely performs at least 
one morally wrong act. 
T of E1PW2 is actual and E1's instantiation freely performs at least 
one morally wrong act. 
T of E1PWn is actual and E1's instantiation freely performs at least 
one morally wrong act. 
Again, notice that there will be corresponding lists F2, F3 and so on right 
up to Fn for each of the essences E1-En mentioned earlier. 
With these lists in mind, we can summarize the arguments and objec-
tions discussed in sections 1-3. Both the argument against EP1 and the 
argument against EP1 * began with the stipulation that the essences in 
question have incompatibilist freedom and pointed out that that stipula-
tion entails 
(I) Each member of each F-list is true in some world or other. 
All parties involved in this discussion grant this entailment (for the pur-
poses of discussion if not because they think it is true). The argument 
for OTD via the denial of EP1 runs as follows: 
Each of the essences we are considering has incompatibilist free-
dom. Therefore, 
(I) Each member of each F-list is true in some world or other. 
Therefore, 
348 Faith and Philosophy 
(II) Each member of each WCF-list is true in some world or 
other. 
Therefore, 
(III) Each WCF-list is such that there is some world in which 
all its members are true (i.e., EPI is false). 
Therefore, 
(IV) There is some world in which all members of all WCF-
lists are true (i.e., OTO). 
In a recent paper, Howard-Snyder and O'Leary-Hawthorne object to the 
inference from (III) to (IV) (and in a reply to their paper, William Rowe 
defends this inference).24 But they seemed to grant P2, which is the infer-
ence from (II) to (III). In section I I objected to PI which is the inference 
from (I) to (II).25 
But then I pointed out that the improved version of Plantinga's FWD 
relies on OTU not OTO. The argument for OTU via the denial of EPI * 
goes like this: 
Each of the essences we are considering has incompatibilist free-
dom. Therefore, 
(I) Each member of each F-list is true in some world or other. 
Therefore, 
(V) Each member of each MCF-list is true in some world or 
other. 
Therefore, 
(VI) Each MCF-list is such that there is some world in which 
all its members are true (i.e., EPI * is false). 
Therefore, 
(VII) There is some world in which all members of all MCF-
lists are true (i.e., OTU). 
I granted PI *, the inference from (1) to (V), and objected to P2*, the infer-
ence from (V) to (VI). (Neither I nor Howard-Snyder and O'Leary-
Hawthorne had anything to say about the inference from (VI) to (VII) 
though presumably, Howard-Snyder and O'Leary-Hawthorne would 
want to resist it.) 
That completes my summary of the arguments and objections. 
However, before closing I will address one final worry. I say Plantinga's 
FWD is improved by employing the weaker OTU rather than the 
stronger OTO as a premise. And in a way that's true (since the same con-
clusion is established using fewer assumptions). But there is also an 
advantage to sticking with would-counterfactuals rather than moving to 
a discussion of might-counterfactuals.>6 For it is the atheist objector who 
needs would-counterfactuals; it is by means of God's knowledge of 
would-counterfactuals of freedom that God is supposed to be able to 
actualize a world with free creatures who always freely do what is right. 
Thus, by granting principles like P (see section 2 of this paper), Plantinga 
is giving the atheistic objector all her assumptions and only then 
responding. And that of course makes good sense dialectically. 
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But what of it? How does this create a problem for anything I've said 
in this paper? Well, it suggests that the recommended improvement of 
Plantinga's FWD isn't advisable from a certain perspective. Worse, it 
suggests that the only objection I considered to Plantinga's original FWD 
(that EPI is epistemically possible because the argument against it relied 
on PI which is questionable) would not be one the atheistic objector 
would be keen to employ. Let me rectify that by giving another objec-
tion to the original FWD." 
In section 3 I explained why it was reasonable to refrain from accept-
ing the inference from (V) to (VI): basically it's because we can't see that 
this inference is valid (though we can't see it is invalid either). Because 
it is reasonable to refrain from accepting this inference, the argument 
against EPI * is not successful. Hence EPI * and, therefore, -OTU are 
epistemically possible. That was my objection to the revised FWD. But 
a parallel objection applies to the original FWD. For P2, the inference 
from (II) to (III), is questionable in the same way as is P2*, the inference 
from (V) to (VI). Because it is reasonable to refrain from accepting the 
inference from (II) to (III), the argument against EPI doesn't succeed. 
Consequently, EPI and, therefore, -OTD are epistemically possible. 2" 
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NOTES 
1. See chapter IX of Plantinga's The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1974). 
2. I am using the claim 'It is epistemically possible that p' as follows: It is 
epistemically possible that p iff it is reasonable to refrain from believing -po 
(Thus, certain necessary falsehoods - for example, either Goldbach's conjecture 
or its denial- are epistemically possible.) 
3. In their paper "Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga's Free Will Defense", 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (1998), 1-21, Daniel Howard-
Snyder and John O'Leary-Hawthorne propose a similar objection to Plantinga's 
FWD only they seem to take the EP2 route. (That they take the EP2 route is sug-
gested by their employment of David Lewis' principle of plenitude near the end 
of their section 2; see their paper for details.) William Rowe has defended 
Plantinga's FWD against their objection in his paper "In Defense of The Free 
Will Defense''', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (1998), 115-20. It's 
worth noting that Rowe's response to their objection does not present a chal-
lenge to Illy objection to Plantinga's FWD. For his response explicitly relies on 
the assumption that Howard-Snyder and O'Leary-Hawthorne will not take the 
EP1 route. See Rowe, note 4. 
4. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978. 
5. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982. 
6. Plantinga employs the notion of strong actualization in The Nature of 
Necessity (see p. 173). 
7. See The Nature of Necessity, p. 188. This is not how Plantinga states the 
definition of transworld depravity but it is basically equivalent to his definition. 
8. It was suggested to me by William Rowe though he should not be 
charged with proposing the specific arguments I criticize in this paper. 
9. Here and elsewhere in this paper I will assume that there are finitely 
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many worlds of this sort when in fact there are probably infinitely many. 
However, it is a little bit easier to present my arguments on the assumption that 
the number of worlds in question is finite. And since nothing depends on thls 
simplifying assumption, I won't bother to further complicate an already difficult 
paper by avoiding it. 
10. Notice that C2 is weaker than Plantinga's OTD. The move from C2 to 
OTD is resisted by those taking the EP2 route in objecting to Plantinga's FWD. 
See section 2 of Howard-Snyder and O'Leary-Hawthorne. 
11. Remember, this is not what I think. I am merely presenting an argument 
to which I will later be objecting. 
12. See his "Respondeo" in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in 
Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge, ed. Jonathan Kvanvig (Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), pp. 328-29. 
13. See David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), p. 29 for 
a discussion of this assumption. It should be noted that Lewis himself accepts 
the inference from A & B to If A were the case then B would be the case. 
14. See Lewis, pp. 21 & 29. It's important to recognize that I'm not reading 
the consequents of might-counterfactuals as assertions of epistemic possibility. 
Thus, the counterfactualIf A were the case B might be the case is not to be under-
stood as saying If A were the case it is epistemically possible that B would be the case. 
15. The Nature of Necessity, p. 180. 
16. If he did, Howard-Snyder's and O'Leary-Hawthorne's objection to 
Plantinga's FWD would have to be modified. Their objection to OTD relies on 
the incompatibility of transworld depravity and transworld sanctity, the latter of 
which they define as follows: 
An essence E is transworld sanctified (in W) iff for every E-perfect world 
W* the following counterfactual of freedom is false (in W): If God had 
strongly actualized T of W* (the largest state of affairs God stronglyactual-
izes in W*) then E's instantiation would have freely performed at least one 
morally wrong act. 
(They don't use these exact words; see section 2 of Howard-Snyder and O'Leary-
Hawthorne.) But transworld sanctity is not incompatible with transworld untrust-
worthiness - or at least we have no good reason to think so. They certainly can't 
prove it is in the way they prove the incompatibility of transworld sanctity and 
transworld depravity. For it's hard to see how the truth of some might-counterfac-
tual (of the sort that will be true of an essence that is transworld untrustworthy) 
entails the truth of any would-counterfactual (of the sort that will be false of an 
essence that is transworld sanctified). In order to give their style of objection to 
OTU, they would have to speak instead of transworld supersanctity where 
An essence E is transworld supersanctified (in W) iff for every E-perfect 
world W* the following counterfactual of freedom is true (in W): If God 
had strongly actualized T of W* (the largest state of affairs God strongly 
actualizes in W*) then E's instantiation would have always freely done what 
is right. 
For they can prove that transworld supersanctity is incompatible with 
transworld untrustworthiness. Or perhaps they are taking for granted the truth 
of principle P (see my section 2) which entails that transworld sanctity is logically 
equivalent to transworld supersanctity. 
17. Notice that you can't show that EP1 * is epistemically possible by relying 
on the incompatibility of transworld untrustworthiness and transworld super-
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sanctity (see note 16 for a definition of the latter). For though they are incompati-
ble, we can prove that no essence is necessarily transworld supersanctified. To 
see this note that the claim that an essence is necessarily transworld supersancti-
fied conflicts with Cl *, the conclusion of stage one of the argument against EPI *. 
And that stage of the argument against EPI * is sound. (So, in responding to the 
revised version of Plantinga's FWD, Howard-Snyder and O'Leary-Hawthorne 
are forced to take the EP2* route whether they want to or not. For their sort of 
response requires them to rely on the incompatibility of transworld supersancti-
ty and transworld untrustworthiness.) 
Rowe mentions that William Hasker has pointed out to him that "it is relatively 
easy to show that each creaturely essence is such that in some world it is not 
transworld sanctified" (see Rowe, note 4). I'm doubtful of that. For it is sufficient 
for an essence's being necessarily transworld sanctified (see my note 16 for a defin-
ition of that property) that no would-counterfactuals of freedom are true of it in 
any world. Thus, to show what Hasker claims is easy to show requires showing 
that there are true would-counterfactuals of freedom - a controversial claim at best. 
But, as I explained in the previous paragraph, it is relatively easy to show that each 
creaturely essence is such that in some world it is not transworld supersanctified. 
(Perhaps Hasker too was taking for granted principle P which entails the logical 
equivalence of transworld sanctity and transworld supersanctity.) 
18. See note 9 in which I address the worry that there are infinitely many E-
perfect worlds, not finitely many as I assume in the text. 
19. This is something that seems to be ignored in the section 1 argument 
against EPI when it says 
Now what about CFl through CFn? We have concluded that each is pos-
sibly true. But can all of them be true in the same world? It seems so. For 
no two of them will be of the form just noted. That is, no two will specify 
the same situation in the antecedent and also specify contradictory actions 
in the consequent. 
The (erroneous) point being made here is that because we can't see that these 
counterfactuals are incompatible we can see that they are compatible. 
20. The comments made in note 9 concerning the simplifying assumption 
that there are finitely many worlds of a certain sort also apply here to the 
assumption that there are finitely many essences of a certain sort. 
21. John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (revised edition) (San Francisco: Harper 
and Row, 1978), p. 367. 
22. J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 174. 
23. A more recent example of a philosopher misunderstanding Plantinga's 
FWD is Douglas Geivett's Evil and the Evidence for God: The Challenge of John 
Hick's Theodicy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993). See pp. 439-40 of 
my review of Geivett's book in Faith and Philosophy 13 (1996) for a brief discus-
sion of this. 
24. See references in note 3. 
25. And below I object to P2 - the inference from (II) to (III). 
26. Thanks to Alvin Plantinga for reminding me of this. 
27. The objection that follows was alluded to at the end of section 3. There I 
pointed out (roughly) that once we see that EPI * entails EPl, my objection to the 
revised FWD entails the following sort of objection to the original FWD. 
28. My thanks to Daniel Howard-Snyder, Hud Hudson, Trenton Merricks, 
Alvin Plantinga, Michael Rea, William Rowe and William Wainwright for help-
ful comments on earlier drafts. Special thanks are due to William Rowe for 
lengthy discussions out of which the idea for this paper grew. 
